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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Monte George Hoffman timely appeals from the district court's Order Dismissing 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief in which the district court summarily dismissed all of 
Mr. Hoffman's post-conviction claims. Mr. Hoffman asserts that the district court 
committed numerous errors in summarily dismissing his claims, including improperly 
taking judicial notice of the "underlying criminal file," completely disregarding the factual 
assertions contained in Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings, and applying a plethora of 
incorrect legal standards to Mr. Hoffman's claims. Because of the district court's 
numerous errors, and because there are genuine issues of material fact which, if 
resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, justify the granting of post conviction relief, 
Mr. Hoffman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his post conviction petition and remand this case to the district 
court for an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Hoffman was driving a borrowed car that he was considering purchasing. 
(R., p.11.) As he backed out of parking space at McDonald's, he saw that both 
headlights were working. (R., p.6.) He had only been driving the car for about fifteen 
minutes when officers stopped him, claiming the car had a broken headlight. (R., pp.6, 
15.) The officers then detained Mr. Hoffman, while investigating and charging him with 
"several misdemeanors." (R., p.7.) Without Mr. Hoffman's consent, and without a 
warrant, officers searched the trunk of the car Mr. Hoffman had been driving and 
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discovered paraphernalia with residue. (R., pp. 7, 24, 126.) Although the officer asserted 
that the search was done pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement, Mr. Hoffman had already been removed from the vehicle before it 
was searched and items in the trunk of the car were not within Mr. Hoffman's reaching 
distance. (R., pp. 7-8, 144.) The search of the car was actually done for investigative 
purposes. (R., p. 7.) 
Mr. Hoffman was charged with possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.42.) 
Public Defender John Dewey was initially appointed to represent him. (R., pp.12, 42.) 
Mr. Dewey never filed a request for discovery, nor did he file a motion to suppress any 
evidence. (R., pp.12-13; See also R., p.8 (asserting that Mr. Hoffman did not receive 
discovery items and the State never provided discovery).) One week later, Mr. Hoffman 
retained l\llike Neilson for representation in the case. (R., p.42.) 
A jury trial was scheduled for April 24, 2008. (R., p.42.) The prosecutor filed a 
request for discovery in March. (R., pp.43, 177-78.) Despite the impending trial, 
Mr. Neilson never filed a request for discovery and never filed a motion to suppress 
evidence. (R., pp.3, 5, 13 ; see also R., pp.42-43, R., p.8.) Instead, on April 18, 2004, 
less than a week before the scheduled trial, Mr. Neilson withdrew as counsel for 
Mr. Hoffman. (R., pp.13-14, 43.) 
The jury trial was vacated and Mr. Hoffman was ordered to obtain new counsel. 
(R., p.43.) A week later, Dave Martinez, a public defender, was appointed to represent 
Mr. Hoffman. (R., pp.14, 43.) Mr. Hoffman repeatedly instructed this court appointed 
attorney to file a motion to suppress. (R., p.8.) Mr. Martinez filed neither a request for 
discovery nor a motion to suppress evidence. (R., pp.14, 43; see also R., p.8.) 
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Because none of his attorneys had requested discovery or pursued any defenses 
at all, and because the State was threatening him with a persistent violator 
enhancement despite the fact that Mr. Hoffman waived his right to a preliminary hearing 
to avoid that possibility, Mr. Hoffman felt coerced into pleading guilty. (R., pp.10, 13, 
15.) Thus, with Mr. Martinez by his side, Mr. Hoffman pleaded guilty to the charge of 
possession of methamphetamine. (Tr. 7/7/2008, p.8, Ls.13-16.) 
Before sentencing, Mr. Hoffman's attorney was changed to Kelly Mallard, and 
Mr. Hoffman asked Mr. Mallard to file a motion to withdraw his plea. (R., p.17.) Although 
some sort of motion was filed, Mr. Mallard later withdrew the motion without having 
requested discovery, reviewed the record, or reviewed discovery items with 
Mr. Hoffman. (R., pp.16; Supp. R., pp.31-32; see a/so R., p.8.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed, 
upon Mr. Hoffman, but retained jurisdiction. (Supp. R., p.35.) Immediately following the 
entry of the Judgment of Conviction, thus during the period of retained jurisdiction, 
Mr. Mallard sent Mr. Hoffman a letter regarding his right to appeal. (R., p.37.) This letter 
claimed that Mr. Hoffman had only 42 days to file an appeal, and told Mr. Hoffman that if 
he wanted an appeal he not only had to notify Mr. Mallard "immediately," but that he 
also had to notify Mr. Mallard of "grounds that are appealable." (R., p.37.) The letter 
further offered as an example of "legal grounds" for direct appeal "ineffective assistance 
of counsel." (R., p.37.) 
Mr. Hoffman attempted to contact Mr. Mallard to request that an appeal be filed. 
(R., p.37.) He also "specifically asked/requested Kelly to file a Direct appeal of the 
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original sentence through letters, family members calling." (R., p.18.) A notice of appeal 
was not filed. (R., p.19.) 
The Department of Corrections recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman. (R., p.40.) A rider review hearing was scheduled, then 
rescheduled, but Mr. Mallard failed to appear at either hearing. (R., pp.17, 39, 40.) After 
Mr. Mallard finally did appear at a hearing, without Mr. Hoffman, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman. (R., p.127, Supp. R.,p.38.) Pursuant to an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer, Rule 35) motion, Mr. Hoffman's sentence was later 
reduced to four years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.22, 125.) 
Mr. Hoffman filed a timely Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, and 
attached exhibits to support some of his claims. (R., pp.1-45.) Mr. Hoffman's claims 
included allegations that each of the four attorneys that represented him rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when each failed to request discovery, failed to file a 
motion to suppress evidence, failed to file a requested appeal, and failed to properly 
consult with Mr. Hoffman about and appeal. (R., pp.9, 12-17, 17-19.) Finally, 
Mr. Hoffman asserted that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
entered because it was coerced by defense counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., pp.2, 9, 10, 13-14, 23-24, 30.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that, if counsel had reviewed 
discovery, counsel would have found that Mr. Hoffman had a defense to the charge of 
possession of a controlled substance because he had just picked up the car he was 
driving and there was no evidence to prove that the paraphernalia found in the case 
belonged to him. (R., pp.15-16.) 
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Mr. Hoffman requested the appointment of counsel in his post conviction action, 
which the district court granted. (R., pp.51-53, 60-61.) 
The State filed an Answer to Mr. Hoffman's petition. (R., pp.78-81.) In the answer 
the State generally denied Mr. Hoffman's substantive claims, asserting that they were 
"conclusory." (R., p.79-80.) The State also asserted that Mr. Hoffman's petition failed to 
state any grounds upon which relief could be granted, that the claims were procedurally 
defaulted "to the extent [the] claims should have been raised on direct appeal," and that 
the petition "contains bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, 
records, or other admissible evidence .... " (R., p.80.) Therefore, the State requested that 
Mr. Hoffman's claims be denied or dismissed. (R., p.81.) The State offered no affidavits 
or exhibits to support its answer. (See generally R., pp.78-83.) 
Counsel appointed to represent Mr. Hoffman filed a Brief In Support of Post 
Conviction Relief And Response To State's Answer. (R., pp.84-90.) This document 
restated Mr. Huffman's claims, but did not discuss the factual assertions made in 
Mr. Hoffman's verified petition, affidavit, or exhibits. (R., pp.84-90.) Despite 
Mr. Hoffman's claims regarding the lack of requests for discovery in the criminal case, 
post conviction counsel did not request discovery in the post conviction action. ( See 
generally R., pp.84-90.) 
Thereafter, the district court entered an Order Vacating Hearing in which it 
affirmatively stated that it would "solely rely on filed pleadings from Petitioner and 
counsel to make a determination in regard to post conviction relief." (R., p.91.) 
Nevertheless, the district court then investigated the case on its own by obtaining and 
reviewing the file in Mr. Hoffman's underlying criminal case. (R., p.93.) In the Notice of 
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Intent to Dismiss, the court stated that it had "carefully reviewed" the "record in the 
underlying case." (R., p.94.) The court also cited to some of the items in the underlying 
record. (R., pp.93, 102,103,104,107,108,110, 111-112.) 
In regard to Mr. Hoffman's assertion that his attorneys rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel when they failed to obtain discovery, the district court found that 
"a Request for Discovery was filed on March 13, 2008." (R., p.102.) The court added, 
"Mr. Hoffman presented no alternative version of the facts that his attorney(s) failed to 
discover that may have changed the outcome of his case." (R., p.102.) The court further 
found, "Even accepting as true that his attorney(s) did not provide him with materials or 
discuss the case, the Petitioner presents no evidence, or even an allegation, about how 
further discussions with his attorney would have changed the outcome of his case." 
(R., p.102.) Finally, the court found that Mr. Hoffman's "contentions are no more than 
conclusory allegations" and Mr. Hoffman had not "satisfied his burden of demonstrating 
that his counsel's conduct was deficient ... and that he was prejudiced .... " (R., p.102.) 
The court similarly found that Mr. Hoffman's claim that his attorneys rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when each failed to file a motion to suppress was "a 
conclusory allegation, as the Petitioner offered no factual basis or evidentiary support." 
(R., p.103.) The court also gave notice of its intent to dismiss this claim because "a 
petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is not allowed to raise any issue that could 
have been raised in a direct appeal. .. " (R., p.103.) Finally, the court intended to dismiss 
the claim because, "Mr. Hoffman did not raise this issue at the time he entered his guilty 
plea, at which time he waived all claims he might have for violations of civil and 
constitutional rights." (R., p.103.) The court conciuded that because Mr. Hoffman had 
6 
offered no evidence in support "of the claim that his due process rights were violated by 
an allegedly illegal search and seizure beyond his conclusory allegations and because a 
post conviction proceeding is not the forum to make a claim regarding failure to 
suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized, the Petitioner has failed to assert a 
cognizable claim in this regard." (R., p.104.) 
The district court found that Mr. Hoffman's claim that his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a timely appeal despite requests 
to do so was "disproved by the record." (R., p.105.) The court's finding was premised 
upon the fact that letters Mr. Hoffman sent to his attorney, after the time to appeal had 
expired, did not include a request for an appeal, and because there were letters from 
Mr. Mallard to Mr. Hoffman "neither of which verifies the Petitioner's claims that he 
requested Mr. Mallard file an appeal on his behalf." (R., p.105-106.) The court also 
found that "no argument is made regarding how the outcome of his case would have 
changed." (R., p.106.) 
In regard to Mr. Hoffman's claim that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or 
voluntarily entered because it was coerced by ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
court found that Mr. Hoffman "waived his right to put on a defense or challenge any of 
the charges against him when he chose to plead guilty." (R., p.106.) The court noted 
that in the "Guilty Questionnaire" Mr. Hoffman had stated that he had discussed the 
case with his attorney and understood he was "giving up all his rights under the 4th , 5th , 
and 6th Amendments to the Constitution .... " (R., p.106-07.) The court also found that 
"there was no contention at the time Mr. Hoffman pied guilty that his attorney had failed 
to discuss the case with him or explain possible defenses." (R., p.107.) Based upon the 
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fact that during the guilty plea hearing Mr. Hoffman had stated that his attorney had 
"explained to you possible defenses you could raise to the Court or jury," even if none of 
his attorneys had actually discussed potential defenses with him, "this court clearly 
informed Mr. Hoffman of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty rather than 
proceeding to trial." (R., p.108.) The court concluded that "Mr. Hoffman has not provided 
any facts or evidence to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency or 
how such deficiency changed the outcome of his case." (R., pp.108.) Thus, the court 
intended to dismiss Mr. Hoffman's claim. 
Regarding all of Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the 
district court determined, "Mr. Hoffman did not offer any specific facts or evidence 
showing ineffectiveness ... ," "did not offer any specific facts or evidence or make any 
argument as to how he was prejudiced ... " and "offered no evidence that the outcome of 
his case would have been different but for his attorneys' unprofessional errors." 
(R., pp.112-13.) The court concluded, "Mr. Hoffman has only offered bare and 
conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, he has not proven 
his allegations regarding ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the 
evidence ..... Thus, his claims of ineffective assistance must be dismissed on that basis, 
as well." (R., p.113.) 
Mr. Hoffman filed, pro se, a request for additional time to resporld to the court's 
notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.122-23.) In that motion, Mr. Hoffman notified the 
court, "Petitioner attempted to convince prior legal counsel to present these issues but 
was ignored or denied each time," and "Under the circumstances petitioner must seek 
assistance from other inmates .... " (R., p.122.) 
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Ten days later, Mr. Hoffman filed, pro se, a verified Modified Motion For Post 
Conviction Relief And Attached Affidavit In Support. (R., p.124-30.) In that document, 
Mr. Hoffman offered additional factual support for his claims, including assertions that 
he would not have agreed to plead guilty had discovery been provided because "the 
loss of the wrongly obtained evidence would have resulted in an acquittal." (R., p.127; 
see also R., p.128.) He also informed the court that "many of the documents which the 
petitioners requires in order to prove his case have been denied to him by the 
prosecutor and by his own legal counsel." (R., p.129.) "As a result, much of the 
documentation cannot be provided by the petitioner at this time, until his repeated 
requests for discovery are finally fulfilled." (R., p.129.) Therefore, he asked the court to 
provide him with: 1) audio recordings of the traffic stop, 2) a copy of any traffic citation 
for the broken headlight, 3) police reports regarding the stop, and 4) audio recordings 
from all court proceedings in the underlying case. (R., p.129.) Mr. Hoffman also again 
requested the appointment of counsel. (R., p.129.) 
About two weeks later, Mr. Hoffman again filed, prose, a verified Modified Motion 
for Post Conviction Relief, And Attached Affidavit In Support, and included a verified 
Memorandum In Support of Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.131-54.) The memorandum 
offered further factual support for his claims. Mr. Hoffman asserted that the traffic stop 
was based upon a malfunctioning headlight, but that the headlight was not 
malfunctioning and "he personally observed the fact that both headlights were functional 
just prior to the traffic stop." (R., p.143.) In addition, the officer asserted that the search 
was done pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement, but Mr. Hoffman had already been removed from the vehicle before it was 
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searched. (R., p.144.) He also asserted that, after Mr. Martinez was appointed to 
represent him, he "was informed that if he was unwilling to plead guilty that his attorney 
was unwilling and unprepared to present a defense." (R., p.140.) Thus, he pleaded 
guilty because "it was impossible under the circumstances to obtain a full and fair 
hearing .... " (R., p.145.) 
In addition, Mr. Hoffman stated that his attorney had informed him that "the fact 
that he was driving the vehicle was enough to convict him of possession." (R., p.146.) 
He stated that, "petitioners [sic] counsel failed or refused to inform him that the 
knowledge of the presence and nature of an item is required to prove possession." 
(R., p.146.) Mr. Hoffman further asserted that if his constitutional rights had not been 
violated, he could "have presented a defense which may have included witness's [sic] to 
the fact that petitioner was not aware of the presence of the items in question." 
(R., p.145.) Mr. Hoffman again requested discovery, and noted that "At no time, even to 
the present has said discovery has been [sic] provided." (R., p.147.) 
The district court entered an Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction relief. 
(R., pp.155-.165) In that order, the district court first incorporated its findings from the 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (R., p.156.) The district court also denied Mr. Hoffman's 
request for discovery finding, despite Mr. Hoffman's assertions that his attorney had 
denied him access to the documents that would support his claims, that "Mr. Hoffman's 
requests for 'discovery' or other documents should be made of his attorney and not this 
court." (Compare R., p.129, 158.) 
The court further addressed the assertions of fact and issues raised in 
Mr. Hoffman's additional verified pleadings. (R., pp.156-65.) The court found that 
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Mr. Hoffman had not offered evidence of his claim that his plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, or voluntarily entered and only "sets forth self-serving statements and legal 
conclusions, but does not point to the record or offer other proof to support his 
contentions." {R., p.160.) In regards to Mr. Hoffman's claim that his plea was the result 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that "the two sentences offered in 
support of this contention amount to general allegations, as the Petitioner does not cite 
to the record or offer other facts or proof. Mr. Hoffman does not even explain what 
'required discovery' was denied him." (R., p.161.) The court again reiterated, "because 
Mr. Hoffman did not raise the issue of his constitutional rights at the time he entered his 
guilty plea and because Mr. Hoffman has not offered any supporting evidence beyond 
his conclusory allegations, the Petitioner has failed to assert a cognizable claim." 
(R., pp.161-62.) 
In addressing Mr. Hoffman's other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
district court found that Mr. Hoffman had "only re-alleged these claims without the 
required accompanying competent and admissible evidence, such allegations again 
amount to bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts." (R., p.164.) 
The court dismissed all of Mr. Hoffman's claims. (R., p.11.) 
Mr. Hoffman timely appealed the order dismissing his post conviction petition. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when, in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's petition for 
post conviction relief, it improperly took judicial notice of "the record in the 
underlying case?" 
2. Did the district court err when, in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's petition for 
post conviction relief, it failed to consider the factual allegations made in 
Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings? 
3. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
4. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claim that his 
plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because it was the 




The District Court Erred When It Improperly Took Judicial Notice Of 'The Record 
In The Underlying Case" And Any Items From The Underlying Criminal Action Not 
Specifically Identified By The District Court Are Not Part Of The Record In This Post 
Conviction Case 
A. Introduction 
ln summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's post conviction claims, the district court 
stated that it had it had "carefully reviewed" the "record in the underlying case." 
Thereafter the district court specifically identified some of the documents it was relying 
upon to deny Mr. Hoffman's claims when it cited to the items in the Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss and the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Because the 
district court did not properly take judicial notice of "the record in the underlying case" 
Mr. Hoffman submits that any portions of that record not specifically cited by the district 
court were not part of the record below and, thus, are not part of the record in this post 
conviction appeal. Accordingly, the absence of any items not specifically cited by the 
district court cannot be presumed to support the district court's findings in this case. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Improperly Took Judicial Notice Of "The Record 
ln The Underlying Case" Or Alternatively When It Considered Evidence Not In 
The Reco rd 
I\Jeither party in this case requested that the district court take judicial notice of 
documents from the district court's file in the underlying criminal case. (See generally 
Record.) The district court initially entered an Order Vacating Hearing in which it 
affirmatively stated that it would "solely rely on filed pleadings from Petitioner and 
counsel to make a determination in regard to post conviction relief." (R., p.91.) 
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Nevertheless, the district court then investigated the case on its own, obtaining and 
reviewing the -file in Mr. Hoffman's underlying criminal case. (R., p.93.) In the Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss, the court stated that it had "carefully reviewed" the "record in the 
underlying case." (R., p.94.) The court also cited to some of the items in the underlying 
record.(R., pp.93, 102,103,104,107,108,110, 111-112.)Mr. Hoffman asserts that the 
district court erred when it apparently took judicial notice of "the record in the underlying 
case." 
A post-conviction proceeding is not an extension of the criminal case from which 
it arises. Rather, it is a separate civil action in which the applicant bears the burden of 
proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 536 (1986). l\lo part 
of the record from the criminal case becomes part of the record in the post-conviction 
proceeding unless it is entered as a exhibit. Transcripts of the pretrial proceedings, the 
trial, and sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even if previously prepared as a result 
of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not before the trial court in the post-conviction 
proceeding and do not become part of the record on appeal unless presented as 
exhibits. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648 (Ct. App. 1994 ). 
Because neither party asked the district court to take judicial notice of the district 
court's own file in the underlying criminal case, at best the district court could only take 
judicial notice under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 ( c). That rule states: "When 
discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not. When a court 
takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same or 
a separate case, the court shall identify the specific documents or items that were so 
noticed." 1.R.E. 201 (c). However, the district court did not do so in this case. Instead, the 
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district court "carefully reviewed ... the record in the underlying case." (R., p.94.) 
Accordingly the district court erred. 
Because the district court only properly took judicial notice of some of the items 
in the underlying criminal record, those being the items specifically identified by the 
court in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, only those items are properly part of the record 
in this case. Any other items which were not specifically identified were not properly 
taken notice of and, therefore, are not part of the record in this post conviction case. As 
such, the fact that any other items are missing from the record on appeal cannot be 
presumed to support the conclusions of the district court. Compare State v. Coma, 133 
Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) ("It is well established that an appellant bears the burden 
to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of 
the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, 
they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."). 
11. 
The District Court Erred When, In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hoffman's Claims, It Failed 
To Consider The Facts Alleged In Mr. Hoffman's Verified Pleadings 
A. Introduction 
Throughout Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings he made a number of factual 
assertions. Yet, in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's petition, the district court 
repeatedly stated that Mr. Hoffman had failed to support rris claims with facts or 
admissible evidence. Because the question of whether Mr. Hoffman's petition was 
improperly summarily dismissed depends upon whether there are genuine issues of 
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material fact, Mr. Hoffman wishes to clarify what factual assertions should have been 
considered by the district court, and must be considered by this Court on review. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Consider The Facts Alleged In 
Mr. Hoffman's Verified Pleadings 
Mr. Hoffman submitted a series of verified pleadings to the district court in 
support of his post conviction claims, including his Petition, Affidavit of Facts In Support 
of Post Conviction Petition, Modified Motion for Post Conviction Relief and Attached 
Affidavit In Support filed June 2, 2010, Modified Motion for Post Conviction Relief and 
Attached Affidavit In Support filed July 8, 2010, and the Memorandum In Support of 
Post Conviction Relief. (See R., pp.4, 31, 130, 137, 150.) In these pleadings, in addition 
to making his legal claims, Mr. Hoffman made factual assertions regarding his claims. 
(See R., pp.1-31, 124-50.) Throughout the Notice of Intent to Dismiss and the Order 
Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district court repeatedly found that 
Mr. Hoffman had not offered facts in support of his claims. (See R., pp.92-117, 155-65.) 
In light of the district court's repeated assertions that Mr. Hoffman had offered no facts 
or evidence in support of his claims, despite the numerous factual allegations in 
Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings, it appears that the district court determined that facts 
in a verified pleading cannot be considered when a court determines whether summary 
dismissal is appropriate. The district court erred and, on review, this Court must 
consider the facts alleged in the verified pleadings. 
"Verification means attestation under oath as to the truth, etc. of the pleadings 
and is, perforce, a personal ceremony .... " Updegraff v. Adams, 66 Idaho 795, 799 
(1946). Accordingly, "[a] verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the 
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personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is 
accorded the same probative force as an affidavit." Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588 
(Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). Furthermore, affidavits are admissible evidence in a 
post conviction proceeding. In an evidentiary hearing, "The court may receive proof by 
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence and may order the applicant 
brought before it for the hearing." I.C. § 19-4907(a). 
Because Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings had the same probative force as an 
affidavit and were admissible evidence, in considering summary judgment, the district 
court was required to consider the facts alleged within those pleadings. See I.C. § 19-
4906(b). The district court's failure to consider those facts was error. In addition, on 
review of the summary dismissal of Mr. Hoffman's claims, this Court must properly 
consider the facts alleged in the verified pleadings. 
The impact of the district court's error in failing to consider the facts alleged in the 
verified pleadings is discussed in relation to the relevant claims below. 
Ill. 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claims Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
A Introduction 
Mr. Hoffman asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As will be discussed in detail below, the 
district court incorrectly found that Mr. Hoffman's claims were bare and conclusory, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, waived by Mr. Hoffman's guilty plea, and waived 
by the failure to assert them on direct appeal. In addition, the district court applied 
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various incorrect legal standards to Mr. Hoffman's claims. For these reasons, and 
because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Hoffman received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hoffman respectfully requests that the district 
court's order summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims be 
vacated, and this case remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1 . Summary Dismissal Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The 
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, 
or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for relief when the court is satisfied 
the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by further 
proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case where 
evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, despite the 
poss.ibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be responsible for 
resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 
(2008)(addressing case where State did not file a response to petition) (citing Riverside 
Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982)(addressing case with stipulated facts).) 
However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the petitioner's 
unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
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Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a 
material issue of fact. J.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that 
would entitle the applicant to relief, if resolved in the applicant's favor, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Baldwin v. State, 
145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that appl;ed by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
2. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
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objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
Ameri4an Bar Association, Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
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Despite the general rule, a presumption of prejudice arises in certain instances. 
This presumption applies when there is a complete denial of counsel during a critical 
stage of the proceedings, when circumstances are such that the likelihood that any 
lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is 
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial, and when counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See e.g., United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That 
His Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Each Failed To 
File A Request For Discovery 
Throughout his verified pleadings, Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when each failed to request discovery in his 
criminal case. (R., pp.2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 26. 29, 127-28, 140.) He also attached 
a copy of the relevant portion of the register of actions in his criminal case, which 
reflects that defense counsel never filed a request for discovery with the court. 
(R., pp.42-43.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that, had his attorneys obtained discovery, 
"obvious defences [sic] would have become evident, and thereby persued [sic] .... " 
(R., p.15.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys would have discovered a "lack of 
evidence to prove the paraphernalia even belonged to the defendant." (R., p.16.) He 
asserted that none of his attorneys "provided a discovery," and absent this ineffective 
assistance of counsel "The case could have resulted in a conviction for misdemeanor 
paraphernalia if not dismissed due to lack of evidence and illegal search and seizure." 
(R., pp.20-21.) Mr. Hoffman asserted, "other than his presence in the vehicle the 
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petitioner is innocent to this charge .... " (R., p.11.) Finally, Mr. Hoffman asserted that he 
would not have pleaded guilty had discovery been provided. (R., pp.127, 128.) 
Mr. Hoffman also made factual assertions to support his claims. He asserted 
that, on the night the drugs were found, he was driving a borrowed car that he was 
considering purchasing. (R., p.11.) As he backed out of a parking space at McDonald's, 
he saw that both headlights were working. (R., p.6.) He had only been driving the car for 
about fifteen minutes when officers stopped him, claiming the car had a broken 
headlight. (R., pp.6, 15.) The officers then detained Mr. Hoffman and charged him with 
"several misdemeanors." (R., p.7.) Without Mr. Hoffman's consent, and without a 
warrant, officers searched the trunk of the car Mr. Hoffman had been driving and 
discovered paraphernalia with residue. (R., pp.?, 24, 126.) The officer asserted that the 
search of the car was done pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement, yet items in the trunk of the car were not within Mr. Hoffman's 
reaching distance. (R., pp.7-8, 144.) 
In addition to his factual allegations, Mr. Hoffman informed the court that he still 
had not obtained the discovery from his criminal case. (R., pp.3, 7, 24.) 
In its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the district court found that Mr. Hoffman's 
contentions were "no more than conclusory allegations." (R., p.102.) The court based its 
determination on the assertions that, "the record shows that a Request for Discovery 
was filed on March 13, 2008," and "Mr. Hoffman presented no alternative version of the 
facts that his attorney(s) failed to discover that may have changed the outcome of the 
case." (R., p.102.) The court determined that "The petitioner supplies no additional facts 
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that would reasonably merit further investigation, nor does he provide evidence of any 
discovery that his attorney(s) failed to complete." (R., p.102.) 
In his Motion for Extension of Time to respond to the Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, Mr. Hoffman explained that he had "attempted to convince prior legal counsel 
to present these issues but was ignored or denied each time." (R., p.122 (emphasis 
added.) He also noted that he was having to seek assistance from other inmates, which 
was difficult as it would result in punishment from the prison administration. (R., p.123.) 
In his response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss, -filed prose, Mr. Hoffman 
again requested the appointment of legal counsel. (R., p.129.) He also asserted that 
"many of the documents which the petitioner requires in order to prove his case have 
been denied to him by the prosecutor and by his own legal counsel." (R., p.129.) 
Further, "As a result, much of the documentation cannot be provided by the petitioner at 
this time, until his repeated requests for discovery are finally fulfilled." (R., p.129.) 
In its subsequent Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district 
court found Mr. Hoffman had on "only re-alleged" his claims regarding his counsel's 
failure to obtain discovery, "without the required accompanying competent and 
admissible evidence, such allegations again amount to bare assertions and speculation, 
unsupported by specific facts." (R. , p.164.) The court noted, 
For example, Mr. Hoffman failed to demonstrate that his counsels' 
performance fell outside the wide range of professional norms. Secondly, 
even accepting the Petitioner's claim that his counsel was inadequate, the 
Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no evidence 
that the outcome of his case would have been drfferent but for his 
attorneys' unprofessional errors. Therefore, the Petitioner has not met his 
burden of demonstrating that his counsel's performance was deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. As such, the Petitioner's claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit. 
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(R., p.164.) 
1. The Fact That The State Filed A Request For Discovery Is Not Relevant 
To The Question Of Whether Mr. Hoffman's Counsel Rendered Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel When Each Failed To File A Request For 
Discovery 
In part, the district court based its dismissal of Mr. Hoffman's assertion of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a discovery request on its finding that 
"the record shows that a Request for Discovery was filed on March 13, 2008 .... " 
(R., p.102.) In fact, a Request for Discovery was filed on March 13, 2008. (R., p.177.) 
This was a request filed by the State. (R., p.177.) The request asked the defense to 
provide information to the State, but does not provide any information to the defense. 
(R., pp.177-79.) 
'"Relevant Evidence"' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. In the 
present case, the State's request for discovery is not of consequence to the 
determination of whether Mr. Hoffman's counsel rendered deficient performance in 
failing to file a request for discovery, or of whether Mr. Hoffman was prejudiced by 
counsels' failure to do so. The fact that the State sought discovery does not make it 
more probable or less probable that Mr. Hoffman's counsel filed a discovery request or 
properly investigated the facts of Mr. Hoffman's case. Thus, the State's request for 
discovery is not evidence relevant to Mr. Hoffman's claims, and the district court erred 
when it relied upon that document in dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claims. 
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2. There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether 
Mr. Hoffman's Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance When Each 
Failed To File A Request For Discovery Which, If Resolved In 
Mr. Hoffman's Favor, Would Entitle Him To The Requested Post 
Conviction Relief 
The district court's findings that Mr. Hoffman's contentions were "no more than 
conclusory allegations" (R., p.102), that Mr. Hoffman "failed to demonstrate that his 
counsels' performance fell outside the wide range of professional norms" (R., p.164), 
failed to provide "the required accompanying competent and admissible evidence" 
(R., p.164), presented only "bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific 
facts" (R., p.164), is simply incorrect. 
Throughout his verified pleadings, Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys failed 
to request or provide to him discovery in his case. (R., pp.2, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 26, 29, 
127-28.) He also attached a copy of the relevant portion of the register of actions in his 
criminal case, which reflects that defense counsel never filed a request for discovery 
with the court. (R., pp.42-43.) In the single pleading filed by the State, it did not stipulate 
to these facts, but rather generally denied all allegations not specifically admitted. (See 
R., pp.78-83.) Although the State didn't stipulate to the facts alleged, neither did it rebut 
them. (See R., pp.78-83.) Thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Mr. Hoffman's attorneys ever investigated his case or obtained discovery 
materials. 
If resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, the facts would entitle Mr. Hoffman to post 
conviction relief. Because the State did not stipulate to the facts alleged, the facts were 
in dispute, and both the district court and this Court are required to accept 
Mr. Hoffman's unrebutted factual allegations as true in deciding whether summary 
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dismissal was appropriate in this case. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Taking 
Mr. Hoffman's assertion, that not one of the four attorneys that represented him filed a 
request for discovery or obtained discovery materials, as true, Mr. Hoffman's attorneys 
performed deficiently. 
Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be sufficient to show deprivation of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145-46 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). "Strategic choices made after less than complete 
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
A reasonable investigation in any Idaho criminal case certainly includes obtaining 
items which the State will likely rely upon to prosecute a defendant and which is readily 
available to the defense through simply filing a discovery request. "Looking at a file the 
prosecution says it will use is a sure bet: whatever may be in that file is going to tell 
defense counsel something about what the prosecution can produce." Rompi//a v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 37 4, 389 (2005). Thus, the effective assistance of counsel includes, at 
a bare minimum, filing a request for discovery from the State. 
Standards of practice maintained by the legal profession show that filing a 
request for discovery is part of a reasonable investigation. 
(a) Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts 
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of 
conviction. The investigation should include efforts to secure information in 
the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The 
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or 
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statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the accused's 
stated desire to plead guilty. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3d ed. 1991 ), 
Defense Function, Standard 4-4.1 (emphasis added); see also Rompi/la, 545 U.S. at 
383 (failure to investigate material relied upon by prosecution was unreasonable); 
Williams, 529 U.S. 362(unreasonable failure to conduct thorough investigation). 
The Idaho Criminal Rules provide a mechanism for a criminal defense attorney to 
fulfill his professional obligation to secure information in the possession of the 
prosecution and law enforcement. Idaho Criminal Rule 16 provides that the State must 
automatically disclose evidence "which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to 
the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment therefor," and "the 
general nature of' 404(b) evidence it intends to introduce at trial. I.C.R. 16(a). However, 
the majority of information and evidence within the State's control need only be 
disclosed "upon written request by the defendant .... " I.C .R. 16(b). 
In addition, the ABA standards address the advice defense counsel must provide 
to a client. "After informing himself or herself fully on the facts and the law, defense 
counsel should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the 
case, including a candid estimate of the probable outcome." ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3d ed. 1991 ), Defense Function, Standard 
4-5.1 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, defense counsel had a duty to investigate the facts of 
Mr. Hoffman's case prior to making strategic decisions or advising Mr. Hoffman about all 
aspects of the case, including possible defenses or plea bargains avallable. Yet, 
counsel did not request discovery to obtain evidence the State would likely use, which 
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was readily available for the asking. Taking Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions as true, 
counsels' performance was deficient. However, in its Answer, the State generally 
denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions that were not specifically admitted. 
(R., pp.79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 
Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred 
when it summarily dismissed this claim. 
3. There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Hoffman 
Was Prejudiced By Counsels' Deficient Performance, Which If Resolved 
In Mr. Hoffman's Favor, Would Entitle Him To The Requested Post 
Conviction Relief 
The district court found that "Mr. Hoffman presented no alternative version of the 
facts that his attorney(s) failed to discover that may have changed the outcome of the 
case." (R., p.102.) The court also determined that 'The petitioner supplies no additional 
facts that would reasonably merit further investigation, nor does he provide evidence of 
any discovery that his attorney(s) failed to complete." (R., p.102.) In its subsequent 
Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district court found, "the 
Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no evidence that the 
outcome of his case would have been different but for his attorneys' unprofessional 
errors." (R., p.164.) 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claims. First, the 
district court erred when it applied an incorrect legal standard to the claims. Second, 
Mr. Hoffman did offer evidence that, had counsel requested discovery, counsel would 
have discovered facts showing that both the stop and search of the car's trunk were 
illegal such that a motion to suppress would have been successful. He also established 
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that had counsel discovered the facts, he would have had a viable defense to the 
possession of a controlled substance charge and would not have pleaded guilty. 
a. The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard To 
Mr. Hoffman's Prejudice Claim 
It must be initially noted that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard 
to the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court dismissed 
Mr. Hoffman's claims based, in part, upon its general finding that in regards to his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims Mr. Hoffman had failed to demonstrate 
prejudice, as he offered no evidence that the outcome of his case would have been 
different but for his attorneys' unprofessional errors." (R., p.164.) As noted in section 
8(2), supra, a petitioner need only show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). In requiring that Mr. Hoffman show that 
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, the court applied a standard 
that is "diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" 
to the clearly established precedent in Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 
b. Mr. Hoffman's Unrebutted Factual Assertions, Taken As True, 
Establish A Reasonable Probability That, Had His Attorneys 
Obtained Discovery In His Case The Evidence Would Have Shown 
That The Stop Of His Car Was Illegal Such That The Evidence 
Found In The Car Would Have Been Suppressed 
Mr. Hoffman met his burden of establishing prejudice. Mr. Hoffman asserted that 
he would not have agreed to plead guilty had discovery been provided, in part because 
"the loss of the wrongly obtained evidence would have resulted in an acquittal." 
(R., p.127; see also R., p.128.) Where a post conviction petitioner was convicted upon a 
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guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the applicant seeking relief from the 
conviction generally must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, 
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). This requires a showing that a decision to not accept 
a plea agreement and plead guilty would have been rational under the circumstances. 
Padilla v. Kentucky,_ U.S._, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). Because Mr. Hoffman 
asserted facts which would have resulted in the suppression of the evidence of 
possession of a controlled substance, Mr. Hoffman established a reasonable probability 
that, absent his counsel's deficient performance, he would not have accepted a plea 
agreement. 
Mr. Hoffman stated that on the night he was stopped, he was driving a borrowed 
car that he was considering purchasing. (R., p.11.) As he backed out of a parking space 
at McDonald's, he saw that both headlights were working. (R., p.6.) He had only been 
driving the car for about fifteen minutes when officers stopped him, claiming the car had 
a broken headlight. (R., pp.6, 15.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that the traffic stop was based 
upon a claimed malfunctioning headlight, but that the headlight was not malfunctioning 
and "he personally observed the fact that both headlights were functional just prior to 
the traffic stop." (R., p.143.) 
A traffic stop by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's 
occupants which implicates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as Article 1, section 17 of the Idaho constitution. See Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293 (1988)(holding 
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"When a vehicle is stopped by a police officer and its occupants are detained, a seizure 
within the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution has occurred .... " Id. at 295.).) Such a stop must be supported by 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic 
laws or that either the vehicle or the occupant is subject to detention in connection with 
a violation of other laws. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). This 
reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than 
speculation or instinct on the part of an officer. Id. In Idaho, the exclusionary rule is 
applied to provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an 
unreasonable government seizure. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 993 (1992). Where 
evidence is obtained as a result of an illegal stop, that evidence must be excluded as 
fruit of the poisonous tree. See e.g., State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 709 
(Ct. App. 2007). 
Taking as true Mr. Hoffman's assertions that the officer justified the traffic stop on 
a malfunctioning headlight, but that both headlights were properly functioning, the stop 
of Mr. Hoffman's car was not based upon reasonable suspicion, the resulting seizure 
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution and Article 1, section 
17 of the Idaho constitution, such that all evidence seized as a result of the stop must 
be excluded as fruit of an illegal stop. Thus, a motion to suppress could have 
succeeded and altered the outcome of Mr. Hoffman's case. The district court erred in 
summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claim. 
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C. Mr. Hoffman's Unrebutted Factual Assertions, Taken As True, 
Establish A Reasonable Probability That, Had His Attorneys 
Obtained Discovery In His Case The Evidence Would Have Shown 
That The Search Of His Car Was Illegal Such That The Evidence 
Found In The Car Would Have Been Suppressed 
Mr. Hoffman stated that the officers detained him while investigating and 
charging him with "several misdemeanors." (R., p.7.) Without Mr. Hoffman's consent, 
and without a warrant, officers searched the trunk of the car Mr. Hoffman had been 
driving and discovered paraphernalia with residue in the trunk of the car. (R., pp.7, 24, 
126.) Although the officer asserted that the search was done pursuant to the search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, Mr. Hoffman had already been 
removed from the vehicle before it was searched and items in the trunk of the car were 
not within Mr. Hoffman's reaching distance. (R., pp.7-8, 144.) The search of the car was 
actually done for investigative purposes. (R., p. 7.) 
It is a basic rule that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, _ 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009)(citation 
omitted); see a/so lo. CONST. art. 1, §17. Among the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. (citation omitted). A search 
incident to arrest may only include "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his 
immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might 
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. (quoting Chime! v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
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The search of the trunk of the car, despite the fact that Mr. Hoffman had been 
removed from the car and the trunk was not within his immediate control, does not fall 
within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Taking 
Mr. Hoffman's assertions of fact as true, the search was unreasonable and violated 
Mr. Hoffman's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, section 17, of the Idaho constitution. In Idaho, the exclusionary rule is also 
applied to provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an 
unreasonable government search. See Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. Thus, the 
paraphernalia seized as the result of the illegal search of the trunk of the car 
Mr. Hoffman was driving would have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ). 
A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not the search of 
Mr. Hoffman's car violated the Fourth Amendment. If the officer's search in fact violated 
the Fourth Amendment, a motion to suppress could have succeeded and altered the 
outcome of Hoffman's case. The district court, thus, erred in summarily dismissing 
Mr. Hoffman's claim. 
d. Mr. Hoffman's Unrebutted Factual Assertions, Taken As True, 
Establish A Reasonable Probability That, Had His Attorneys 
Obtained Discovery In His Case The Evidence Would Have 
Established Viable Defenses To The Possession Charge Such That 
Mr. Hoffman Would Not Have Pleaded Guilty, But Would Have 
Insisted On Going To Trial 
Mr. Hoffman also offered facts to support his claim that, had counsel obtained 
discovery and reviewed it with him, counsel would have discovered viable defenses to 
the possession charge. (See R., pp.15, 29.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that counsel would 
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have found that Mr. Hoffman did not own the car he was driving, but was just test 
driving it, that he had just picked up the car fifteen minutes before the stop, and that he 
was merely present in the car. (R., pp.8, 10, 11, 15, 26.) Mr. Hoffman further asserted 
that he was factually innocent, that he had no knowledge of the paraphernalia found, 
that he did not possess methamphetamine, that there was a reasonable doubt that the 
paraphernalia belonged to him, and a fair trial would have proven his innocence to the 
charge of possession. (R., pp.11, 21, 24, 25, 26.) 
where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover 
potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error 
"prejudiced" the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to 
trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would 
have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This 
assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the 
evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. 
Had counsel not performed deficiently, counsel would have discovered evidence 
that police found the paraphernalia with methamphetamine residue in the trunk of a car 
and that Mr. Hoffman did not own, but was merely driving. (R., pp.8, 10, 11, 15, 26.) 
This coupled with Mr. Hoffman's lack of prior knowledge of the item, and the fact that he 
was only test driving the car for fifteen minutes before the stop occurred established a 
reasonable defense to the charge of possession of a controlled substance. 
Constructive possession is generally established by proof that a defendant had 
knowledge of the substance and possessed dominion and control over it. State v. 
Clayton, 101 Idaho 15 (1980). "In other words, constructive possession exists where a 
nexus between the accused and the controlled substance is sufficiently proven so as to 
give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, 
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rather, had the power and the intent to exercise dominion or control over the 
[substance]." State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784 (Ct. App. 1987). The lack of a nexus 
between the paraphernalia found in the trunk of the car and Mr. Hoffman was a defense 
to the charge of constructive possession as there was no evidence giving rise to a 
reasonable inference that Mr. Hoffman was more than a bystander. Mr. Hoffman's 
unrebutted assertion of lack of knowledge of the presence of the item, taken as true, 
shows that the State could not have had evidence that he had the intent to exercise 
dominion or control over the paraphernalia or its accompanying residue. Thus, there is a 
reasonable possibility that Mr. Hoffman had a defense to the charge such that he would 
not pleaded guilty and the outcome of the proceedings would have been an acquittal. 
e. Even Assuming That The District Court Was Correct In Finding 
That Mr. Hoffman Had Failed To Offer Sufficient Evidence To 
Support His Prejudice Claim, Mr. Hoffman Recited Why The 
Information Was Not Attached And Requested That The State 
Produce Discovery Such That The Record Would Contain The 
Relevant Information 
Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations shall be attached 
to the application or the application shall recite why they are not attached." I.C. §19-
4903. Admittedly, Mr. Hoffman did not provide the court with actual copies of the 
discovery materials that defense counsel would have received had a request for 
discovery been filed. However, initially Mr. Hoffman informed the court that he still had 
not obtained the discovery from his criminal case. (R., pp.3, 7, 24.) After the district court 
appointed post conviction counsel, counsel never filed a request for discovery. ( See 
generally Record.) After post conviction counsel had been appointed, Mr. Hoffman 
explained that, he had "attempted to convince prior legal counsel to present these 
35 
issues but was ignored or denied each time." (R., p.122 (emphasis added.) In his 
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss, filed pro se, Mr. Hoffman again 
requested the appointment of legal counsel. (R., p.129.) He also asserted that "many of 
the documents which the petitioner requires in order to prove his case have been 
denied to him by the prosecutor and by his own legal counsel." (R., p.129.) "As a result, 
much of the documentation cannot be provided by the petitioner at this time, until his 
repeated requests for discovery are finally fulfilled." (R., p.129.) 
Because Mr. Hoffman recited why the necessary documents were not attached, 
and repeatedly asserted that he could not provide them without discovery, and notified 
the court that his counsel was ignoring and denying his requests for this discovery, the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims. Summary dismissal is only 
appropriate where "no purpose would be served by any further proceedings." I.C. §19-
4906(b). However, addressing Mr. Hoffman's renewed request for counsel and 
conducting discovery proceedings in this case would serve the purpose of providing 
Mr. Hoffman with the documents he asserted would support his claims. Thus, further 
proceedings would serve a further purpose, and summary dismissal was inappropriate. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That 
His Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Each Failed To 
File A Motion To Suppress1 
The district court dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claim that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when they failed to file a motion to suppress, in part, 
because "the Petitioner offered no factual basis or evidentiary support" for the claim. 
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(R., p.103.) The court also dismissed this claim because it should have been brought in 
a direct appeal, because Mr. Hoffman did not raise the claim at the time he pleaded 
guilty, and because post conviction "is not the forum to make a claim regarding failure to 
suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized." (R., pp.103-104.) For the reasons argued 
below, the district court's bases for dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claim are neither 
supported by the record nor based on proper legal theories or reasoning. In fact, some 
of the district court's holdings are based upon a fundamental misunderstandi11g of 
constitutional law, a misreading of case law, and are in direct contravention of both the 
Idaho Supreme Court's and the United States Supreme Court's clearly established 
precedent. Thus, the district court's order dismissing this claim should be vacated. 
1. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim 
For Lack Of A Factual Basis Or Evidentiary Support 
a. The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Hoffman Failed To 
Offer Evidentiary Support For His Claim That His Counsel 
Performed Deficiently When Each Failed To File A Motion To 
Suppress And That He Was Prejudiced By This Deficient 
Performance 
Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys failed to file a motion to suppress in his 
case, and that he had specifically asked his appointed attorney to file such a motion. 
(R., pp.8, 13.) In addition, he attached the register of actions from the underlying 
criminal case to his petition, which showed that a motion to suppress was not filed. 
(R., pp.42-43.) As noted is section C, supra, Mr. Hoffman alleged facts to support the 
filing of a motion to suppress. 
1 Because Mr. Mallard did not represent Mr. Hoffman until after Mr. Hoffman had 
pleaded guilty, such that he could not have filed a motion to suppress, Mr. Hoffman's 
claim only appropriately applies to Mr. Dewey, Mr. Nielson, and Mr. Martinez. 
37 
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a 
motion in the underlying action, the court properly may consider the probability of 
success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity 
constituted incompetent performance. Baldwin, 145 Idaho 155 ( citation omitted). 
Similarly, the failure of counsel to file a motion to suppress will satisfy the prejudice 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test where the reviewing court determines 
that the evidence at issue would have been suppressed. State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 
300, 308 (1999); see also Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)(finding that 
when failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is principal allegation of 
ineffectiveness, petitioner must also prove that Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious 
and there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent 
the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Id. at 375). 
When Mr. Hoffman's unrebutted factual assertions are taken as true, the search 
of Mr. Hoffman's car violated the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Hoffman's assertions in this 
regard are further articulated in section l(C)(b )-( c), supra, and are incorporated herein 
by reference thereto. If the officer's search in fact violated the Fourth Amendment, a 
motion to suppress could have succeeded and altered the outcome of Hoffman's case. 
However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual 
assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp.79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine 
issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle 
Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed this 
claim. 
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b. Even Assuming That The District Court Was Correct In Finding 
That Mr. Hoffman Had Failed To Offer Sufficient Evidence To 
Support His Prejudice Claim, Mr. Hoffman Recited Why The 
Information Was Not Attached And Requested That The State 
Produce Discovery Such That The Record Would Contain The 
Relevant Information 
Mr. Hoffman's claims in this regard are identical to the claims made in section 
l(C)(3)(e), supra, which need not be repeated here. Rather, the argument, authority and 
citations to the record are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
C. In Addition, The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard 
To Mr. Hoffman's Prejudice Claim 
Additionally, in its Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district 
court applied an incorrect legal standard to the prejudice prong of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. The court dismissed Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims, in part, based upon its finding that "Petitioner still failed to 
demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no evidence that the outcome of his case would 
have been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors." (R., p.164 (emphasis 
added).) As previously noted, in section 8(2), supra, a petitioner need only show a 
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694(emphasis added). In 
requiring that Mr. Hoffman show that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different the court applied a standard that is "diametrically different," "opposite in 
character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to the clearly established precedent in 
Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 
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2. The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Hoffman Could Not Raise 
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim In Post Conviction Because It 
Could Have Been Raised In A Direct Appeal 
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim based, in part, upon its finding that "a petitioner in a post-conviction 
proceeding is not allowed to raise any issue that could have been raised on a direct 
appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known and could not have 
reasonably been known at the time of the appeal." (R., pp.103.) The court also found 
that "The failure to suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized is not fundamental error 
which may be cured in a post-conviction relief proceeding even though the error could 
have been, but was not raised on direct appeal." (R., pp.103 (citing Nelson v. State, 124 
Idaho 596 (Ct. App. 1993) and Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493 (Ct. App. 1985).) The 
district court erred in dismissing Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
this regard as the ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not have been raised in 
a direct appeal. 
Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for 
appeal through an objection at trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (201 O), reh'g 
denied (Dec. 7, 201 O),(citation omitted). "If there is insufficient evidence in the appellate 
record to show clear error, the matter would be better handled in post-conviction 
proceedings." Id. at 226. If a petitioner wishes the appellate court to consider evidence 
of ineffective assistance of counsel outside the record on direct appeal, he must pursue 
the issue in a post conviction action. See Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443. 
In making his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Hoffman extensively 
relied upon evidence outside of the record that would not have been available in a direct 
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appeal. (See R., pp.1-31; see also section l(C), supra.) Thus, Mr. Hoffman could not 
have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a direct appeal, even if he had 
not been denied a direct appeal through additional ineffective assistance of counsel. 
( See subsection F, supra, addressing Mr. Hoffman's claims regarding the denial of an 
appellate proceeding.) 
In addition, the two cases relied upon by the district court to hold that 
Mr. Hoffman could not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim do not support 
the district court's holding. In each case, the post conviction petitioner's claim regarding 
suppression of evidence was not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at all, such 
that they do not address the issue that was before the district court in the case at bar. 
See Nelson, 124 Idaho at 598; Maxfield, 108 Idaho at 497, 500. Furthermore, in 
Maxfield, the issues had been "extensively litigated before a magistrate on a pretrial 
motion to suppress ... ," and in Nelson, a motion to suppress had been filed prior to trial, 
such that the suppression issues were preserved for review on direct appeal. Nelson, 
124 Idaho at 598; Maxfield, 108 Idaho at 500. Such is not the case here. 
Because Mr. Hoffman could not have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim in a direct appeal, the district court erred in dismissing his claim on that ground. 
3. The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Hoffman Could Not Raise 
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim In Post Conviction Because 
He Did Not Raise The Issue At The Time He Entered His Guilty Plea And 
Waived His Right To File A Motion To Suppress When He Pleaded Guilty 
The district court sought to justify summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, in part, upon the fact that Mr. Hoffman did not raise the 
claim at the time he pleaded guilty, "at which time he waived all claims he might have 
for violations of civil and constitutional rights." (R., pp.103.) Similarly, the district court 
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summarily dismissed the claim because Mr. Hoffman waived his right to file a motion to 
suppress at the time he pleaded guilty. (R., p.104.) The district court's holdings in this 
regard evidence a fundamental misunderstanding of both the kind and nature of the 
claim Mr. Hoffman raised. 
Mr. Hoffman repeatedly asserted that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel. (R., pp. 9, 12, 15-16, 29.) Mr. Hoffman asserted a violation of his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, which would include the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. (R., p.2; see a/so Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).) Thus, 
Mr. Hoffman did not seek to "merely avail himself of the exclusionary rule," rather, in this 
collateral attack on his conviction he sought, and continues to seek, to protect his 
personal right effective assistance of counsel. See Kimme/man, 477 U.S., 378. While 
Mr. Hoffman's "defaulted Fourth Amendment claim is one element of proof of his Sixth 
Amendment claim, the two claims have separate identities and reflect different 
constitutional values." Id. at 375. 
The district court's presumption that Mr. Hoffman should have asserted his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the time of his plea, the very time he asserts 
he was actively receiving ineffective assistance of counsel, and waived the 
constitutional claim when he entered his plea, ignores the nature of an effective waiver 
of a constitutional right. A defendant may waive a right of constitutional magnitude, so 
long as the defendant does so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Perry, 150 
Idaho at 227; see a/so United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) ("Waiver is 
different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of 
a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."'). 
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However, when a person receives ineffective assistance of counsel it impacts any 
alleged waivers of constitutional claims made at that time, including the alleged waiver 
of Mr. Hoffman's right to effective assistance of counsel. "'Of all the rights that an 
accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most 
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."' Kimme/man, 
477 U.S. at 377(emphasis added) (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). In fact, "without counsel the right to a fair trial 
itself would be of little consequence ... for it is through counsel that the accused 
secures his other rights." Id. (citation omitted and emphasis added). The district court 
failed to comprehend that whether Mr. Hoffman received ineffective assistance of 
counsel informs the review of whether any waivers he may have made during the guilty 
plea process were made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily. 
Moreover, any waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel, entered at 
the time the defendant is still burdened with ineffective counsel, is not a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
defendants typically cannot identify the fact that they are receiving ineffective assistance 
of counsel at the time they are receiving it. 
A layman will ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel's errors and to 
evaluate counsel's professional performance, ... consequently a criminal 
defendant will rarely know that he has not been represented competently 
until after trial or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about 
his case. Indeed, an accused will often not realize that he has a 
meritorious ineffectiveness claim until he begins collateral review 
proceedings, particularly if he retained trial counsel on direct appeal. 
Kimme/man, 477 U.S. at 378. 
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The entire premise of the constitutional right to counsel is that defendants are not 
expected to have sufficient knowledge of the law to assert their own claims without the 
assistance of counsel. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no 
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, 
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. left without the aid of counsel he 
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or 
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If 
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant 
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. 
Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)(emphasis added). These dangers are no 
less relevant when a defendant lacks effective assistance of counsel than when they 
are denied counsel altogether. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel 
cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment of counsel. Avery v. State of Alabama, 
308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). Rather, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance 
of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
In sum, the district court erred in finding that Mr. Hoffman could not litigate his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this post conviction action because he didn't 
assert it at the time he pleaded guilty. As the United States Supreme Court recognized 
many years ago, to deny a petitioner a collateral attack on his conviction which is based 
primarily on incompetent handling of Fourth Amendment issues would deny most 
defendants whose trial attorneys performed incompetently in this regard the opportunity 
to vindicate their right to effective trial counsel. Kimme/man, 477 U.S. at 378. This would 
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"severely interfere with the protection of the constitutional rights asserted" by the post 
conviction petitioner. Id. The district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Hoffman's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to file a motion to suppress based 
upon the fact that he didn't raise the claim when he pleaded guilty must be vacated. 
E. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That 
His Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When He Failed To 
Adequately Consult With Mr. Hoffman About Filing An Appeal Arid Failed File A 
Timely Notice Of Appeal Despite A Specific Request That He Do So 
Following the entry of the Judgment of Conviction, during the period of retained 
jurisdiction, Mr. Mallard sent Mr. Hoffman a letter regarding his right to appeal. 
(R., p.37.) This letter claimed that Mr. Hoffman had only 42 days to file an appeal, and 
told Mr. Hoffman that if he wanted an appeal he not only had to notify Mr. Mallard 
"immediately," but that he also had to notify Mr. Mallard of "grounds that are 
appealable." (R., p.37.) The letter further offered as an example of "legal grounds" for 
direct appeal "ineffective assistance of counsel." (R., p.37.) 
Mr. Hoffman attempted to call Mr. Mallard after sentencing, but Mr. Mallard's 
office would not accept his calls. (R., p.20.) Accordingly, Mr. Hoffman asserted that 
Mr. Mallard, "should have consulted Hoffman regarding his right to appeal when 
inquired, but did not." (R., p.19.) Mr. Hoffman also stated that after he received the 
October 23, 2008 letter from Mr. Mallard, he attempted to contact Mr. Mallard to request 
that an appeal be filed. (R., p.37.) In his verified pleadings, Mr. Hoffman stated that he 
"specifically asked/requested Kelly to file a Direct appeal of the original sentence 
through letters, family members calling." (R., p.18.) Yet Mr. Mallard did not undertake 
the ministerial task of filing a notice of appeal. (R., p.19.) 
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1. Mr. Mallard Rendered Deficient Performance When He Failed To File The 
Requested Notice Of Appeal And When He Failed To Adequately Consult 
With Mr. Hoffman Regarding Whether To Appeal 
The district court found that Mr. Hoffman's claim that his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a timely appeal despite requests 
to do so was "disproved by the record." (R., p.105.) The court's finding was premised 
upon the fact that letters Mr. Hoffman sent to his attorney, after the time to appeal had 
expired, did not include a request for an appeal, and that there were letters from 
Mr. Mallard to Mr. Hoffman "neither of which verifies the Petitioner's claims that he 
requested Mr. Mallard file an appeal on his behalf." {R., p.105-106.) 
a. Mr. Mallard Rendered Deficient Performance When He Failed To 
File The Requested Notice Of Appeal 
The district court incorrectly determined that Mr. Hoffman's claim was disproved 
by the record. Although Mr. Hoffman did attach copies of letters he had sent to 
Mr. Mallard, after the time to appeal had expired, which did not include specific requests 
that an appeal be filed, he did not assert that this was the only contact he had with 
Mr. Mallard, and it was not the sum total of the facts alleged. Mr. Hoffman's verified 
pleadings additionally asserted that, Mr. Hoffman "specifically asked/requested Kelly to 
file a Direct appeal of the original sentence through letters, family members calling." 
{R., p.18.) 
The district court acknowledged Mr. Hoffman asserted that, at some point he had 
made a specific request that an appeal be filed, but rejected this factual assertion 
because it was not verified by Mr. Mallard's letters. (See R., pp.104-105.) In determining 
whether to render summary judgment, where the facts are disputed, a court is required 
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to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true. Charboneau, 144 Idaho 
at 903. There is no requirement that the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations be 
otherwise verified by the attorney that the petitioner asserts rendered deficient 
performance. Thus, the district court's rejection of Mr. Hoffman's unrebutted factual 
assertion while summarily dismissing the claim was error. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a lawyer who 
disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a 
manner that is professionally unreasonable. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 
(2000). Thus, taking Mr. Hoffman's factual assertion that he specifically requested Mr. 
Mallard file an appeal as true, Mr. Mallard's failure to file an appeal when specifically 
requested to do so is deficient performance. 
b. Because Mr. Mallard Failed To Adequately Consult With 
Mr. Hoffman About Taking An AppeaL His Performance Was 
Deficient 
In addition, the district court relied upon an October 23, 2008, letter Mr. Mallard 
sent to Mr. Hoffman as sufficient explanation of Mr. Hoffman's appellate rights. In doing 
so, the court ignored the fact that the information Mr. Mallard did provide to Mr. Hoffman 
regarding his appellate rights was patently incorrect legal advice. Even if Mr. Hoffman 
had not specifically requested that Mr. Mallard file a notice of appeal, Mr. Mallard's 
proffering of incorrect legal advice and failure to adequately consult with Mr. Hoffman 
regarding the filing of an appeal after the district court relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Hoffman was deficient performance. 
In Mr. Mallard's October 23, 2008 letter to Mr. Hoffman counsel provided 
incorrect legal advice on both when Mr. Hoffman could appeal and how Mr. Hoffman 
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could have an appeal filed. In 2008, the Idaho Appellate Rules made it clear that "In a 
criminal case, the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of time the district 
court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code." Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) 
(2008). The district court entered its Minute Entry And Order And Commitment Order, in 
which the district court adjudged Mr. Hoffman guilty and retained jurisdiction on October 
20, 2008. (Supp. R., pp.34-31.) Thus, Mr. Hoffman could timely file a notice of appeal 
any time after this judgment was entered until 42 days after the court's period of 
retained jurisdiction ended. Despite this, Mr. Mallard claimed, "The time to file your 
appeal is 42 days from the date of conviction." (R., p.37.) Mr. Mallard affirmatively 
misled Mr. Hoffman as to the time period for filing a notice of appeal. 
Mr. Mallard further claimed that Mr. Hoffman had to notify him not only of a desire 
to appeal, but as to "grounds that are appealable." (R., p.37.) There is no support in the 
law for this claim. Prevailing professional standards establish that the decision of 
whether to file an appeal is ultimately to be made by the defendant, not the attorney. 
ASA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, (3d ed. 1991 ), 
Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2(a)(v). Counsel does not make a strategic decision as 
to whether to file an appeal. Roe, 528 U.S. at 477. Rather, "filing a notice of appeal is a 
purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflect[s] inattention to the defendant's 
wishes." Id. Mr. Mallard's incorrect legal advice to Mr. Hoffman that he not only had to 
notify counsel of his desire to appeal, but also had to justify that desire by establishing 
to Mr. Mallard "grounds that are appealable" was deficient performance. 
Mr. Mallard's proffering of incorrect legal advice on both when Mr. Hoffman could 
appeal and how Mr. Hoffman could have an appeal filed was deficient performance. 
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Mr. Mallard's failure to consult with Mr. Hoffman after the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction was also deficient performance. The district court relinquished 
jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman despite the fact that Mr. Hoffman completed all required 
programming during the period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.18; Supp. R., p.38.) 
Mr. Hoffman was not transported to the district court for his rider review hearing, such 
that he could not consult with Mr. Mallard about an appeal at that time. (R., p.28.) 
Mr. Hoffman stated that after he was sentenced he attempted to call Mr. Mallard, but 
Mr. Mallard's office would not accept his calls. (R., p.20.) Mr. Hoffman attempted to 
contact Mr. Mallard on numerous occasions, and ultimately began keeping a log of his 
attempts, which shows that when he would call, Mr. Mallard's office would simply hang 
up on him. (R., p.41.) 
Counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about 
an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want 
to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that 
this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in 
appealing. Roe, 528 U.S. at 480. To "consult" with a defendant regarding filing an 
appeal has "a specific meaning-advising the defendant about the advantages and 
disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the 
defendant's wishes.'' Id. at 478. The United State Supreme Court expects that courts 
applying this test "will find, in the vast majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to 
consult with the defendant about an appeal." Id. at 481. 
In the present case, Mr. Mallard had a duty to consult with Mr. Hoffman because 
there were nonfrivolous grounds to appeal, i.e. whether the district court abused its 
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discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman, and because Mr. Hoffman 
was repeatedly attempting to contact Mr. Mallard, from which Mr. Mallard should have 
recognized that Mr. Hoffman was reasonably demonstrating that he was interested in 
appealing. 
Although where "a sentencing court's instructions to a defendant about his 
appeal rights in a particular case [can be] so clear and informative as to substitute for 
counsel's duty to consult," that was not what happened in Mr. Hoffman's case. Like 
Mr. Mallard, the district court affirmatively misled Mr. Hoffman in regards to his right to 
appeal. The judgment stated, "Defendant is herewith advised that in the event said 
Defendant desires to appeal the foregoing sentence, said appeal must be filed with the 
Idaho Supreme Court no later than forty-two days from the date said sentence is 
imposed." (Supp. R., p.36.) The district court provided no instructions on Mr. Hoffman's 
appellate rights in the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., p.38-39.) Thus, Mr. Mallard 
was not relieved of his duty to consult with Mr. Hoffman. 
Taking Hoffman's unrebutted factual assertions as true, Mr. Mallard's failure to 
provide correct legal advice regarding Mr. Hoffman's appellate rights and failure to 
adequately consult with Mr. Hoffman following the relinquishment of jurisdiction was 
deficient performance. However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of 
Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp.79-80.) 
Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, 
would entitle Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed this claim. 
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2. Mr. Hoffman Was Prejudiced By Mr. Mallard's Failures Because 
Mr. Hoffman Was Deprived Of Counsel At A Critical Stage Of The 
Proceedings And Denied Appellate Proceedings Altogether 
In regards to prejudice, the district court dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claim based 
upon the finding "no argument is made regarding how the outcome of his case would 
have changed." (R., p.106.) In doing so, the district court applied an incorrect legal 
analysis. See Roe, 528 U.S. at 482-83. Rather, when an attorney renders deficient 
performance by failing to file a requested notice of appeal or by failing to properly 
consult with the defendant about an appeal, and that failure results in the forfeiture of an 
appeal, "counsel's deficient performance has deprived respondent of more than a fair 
judicial proceeding; that deficiency deprived respondent of the appellate proceeding 
altogether." Roe, 528 U.S. at 482-83. The denial of counsel during a critical stage and 
the resulting denial of an entire judicial proceeding "demands a presumption of 
prejudice." Id. 
Taking Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions as true, prejudice is presumed in this 
instance. However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual 
assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp.79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine 
issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle 




The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That His 
Plea Was Not Entered Knowingly, Intelligently, Or Voluntarily Because It Was The 
Result Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Mr. Hoffman asserted that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
entered because it was coerced by his counsels' failure to request discovery, failure to 
file a motion to suppress, and failure to inform him of, or to pursue, defenses to the 
charge. (See R., pp. 9, 3, 10, 25, 140, 142, 144-45, 146.) He further asserted that 
counsel erroneously told him that the mere fact that he was driving the car where the 
paraphernalia with residue was found was sufficient to convict Mr. Hoffman for 
possession. (R., p.146.) 
In its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the district court interpreted Mr. Hoffman's 
claims regarding the failure to pursue or inform him of defenses as merely an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.106-108.) The court found that Mr. Hoffman had 
"waived his right to present a defense or challenge any of the charges against him when 
he plead guilty." (R., pp.106-07.) The court also found that "there was no contention at 
the time Mr. Hoffman pleaded guilty that his attorney had failed to discuss the case with 
him or explain possible defenses." (R., p.107.) Further, the court determined that, 
because Mr. Hoffman waived his right to a jury trial when he pleaded guilty, it was 
irrelevant whether counsel discussed potential defenses with him. (R., pp.107-08.) The 
court concluded that Mr. Hoffman had failed to provide "facts or evidence to 
demonstrate he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency or how such deficiency 
changed the outcome of his case." (R., p.108.) 
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In addition, the district court found that Mr. Hoffman had presented "no evidence 
of any coercion by his attorney(s). He does not assert how he may have been 
pressured to plead guilty." (R., p.110.) The court determined that the record of the guilty 
plea proceedings established that Mr. Hoffman entered a voluntary plea because 
Mr. Hoffman stated at that time that he had not been threatened into pleading guilty, 
established the terms of the plea agreement, and because Mr. Hoffman said his plea 
was "entirely voluntary and of your own free wiill." (R., pp.110-11.) The court found that 
"there is no evidence to support the Petitioner's contention that he felt coerced into 
accepting the plea agreement or that his counsel was in any way ineffective in the entry 
of the plea." (R., pp.112.) Finally, the court concluded, "Mr. Hoffman has only offered 
bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence .... " 
(R., p.113.) 
In the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district court 
reiterated its finding that Mr. Hoffman had "only offered conclusory and bare allegations 
in regard to this argument," and found that Mr. Hoffman had only set "forth self-serving 
statements and legal conclusions, but does not point to the record or offer other proof to 
support his contentions." (R., p.160.) 
Mr. Hoffman submits that the district court erred when it relied upon the records 
of the taking of his guilty plea, to the exclusion of other evidence regarding the 
circumstances of the entry of the plea, to determine that the plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered. When all the evidence is considered, Mr. Hoffman 
did offer sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
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his plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered such that he is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, "It is elementary that a 
coerced plea is open to collateral attack." Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215 
(1973). This is true even when a petitioner bases his claims on things that occurred 
prior to the taking of the plea and informed the court, at the time the plea was entered, 
that it was "given voluntarily and knowingly, that he understood the nature of the charge 
and the consequences of the plea, and that he was in fact guilty." Id. at 213-214. 
Although the objective of following Idaho Criminal Rule 11 procedures is to flush out and 
resolve issues regarding the plea, "like any procedural mechanism, its exercise is 
neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an 
opportunity to prove the allegations" of coercion. Cf Id. at 215(addressing Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11 ). 
Although the record of guilty plea proceedings is relevant to a subsequent claim 
that the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, "the barrier of the 
plea or sentencing proceeding record, although imposing, is not invariably 
insurmountable." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (U.S.N.C. 1977). In 
administering the writ of habeas corpus "federal courts cannot fairly adopt a per se rule 
excluding all possibility that a defendant's representations at the time his guilty plea was 
accepted were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or 
misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate 
basis for imprisonment." Id. at 75. This Court sees the "Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act as an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and not as a denial of the 
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same" See Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 237 (1969). In addressing post conviction 
claims regarding the nature of a plea, this Court has not adopted a per se rule limiting 
review to the record of the proceedings at which the plea was taken, to the exclusion of 
additional evidence of what led to the entry of the plea. See McKeeth v. State, 140 
Idaho 847 (2004)(considering evidence outside of the written plea agreement to 
determine whether plea was entered as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
In limiting its consideration of whether Mr. Hoffman entered a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary plea to the record of the taking of the plea, to the exclusion of other 
evidence in the post conviction record regarding the circumstances of the entry of the 
plea, the district court erred. 
The district court also erred when it found that Mr. Hoffman had only offered bare 
and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence .. . ," 
(R., pp.113), and that "there is no evidence to support the Petitioner's contention that he 
felt coerced into accepting the plea agreement or that his counsel was in any way 
ineffective in the entry of the plea" (R., pp.112). Mr. Hoffman offered evidence that his 
plea was entered as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, including his attorneys 
failure to request discovery, failure to file a motion to suppress, and misunderstanding of 
the elements of the crime. 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) claim that a guilty plea is 
invalid because it was not knowlngly, intelligently, or voluntarlly entered into may be 
raised in a post-conviction petition. State v. Sands, 121 Idaho 1023 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea 
process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness 
of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice ''was within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. 
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Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 
(1970). As we explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 
1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty upon the 
advice of counsel "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character 
of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was 
not within the standards set forth in McMann." Id., at 267, 93 S.Ct., at 
1608. 
Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57. 
Taking Mr. Hoffman's factual allegations as true, the advice counsel gave to 
Mr. Hoffman regarding entering a plea was not within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in a criminal case. Counsel advised Mr. Hoffman to plead guilty 
without having properly investigated the case to determine possible defenses to the 
charges, including suppression of the evidence. Mr. Hoffman's assertions in this regard 
are fully articulated in sections l(C) and (D), supra, and are incorporated herein by 
references thereto. 
In addition, counsel misinformed 1\/lr. Hoffman of the elements of the crime to 
which he was pleading guilty when he told Mr. Hoffman that "the fact that he was driving 
the vehicle was enough to conviction him of possession." (R., p.146.) The United States 
Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea, entered without the defendant/petitioner 
understanding all of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty, is 
constitutionally invalid. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618-619 (1998). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized this same basic principle and has held that, 
"Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether 
the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the 
charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating 
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himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading 
guilty." State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34 (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that 
in order to enter a valid guilty plea, the defendant must understand the nature of the 
charge against him, including the elements of the crime charged. 
Counsel's statement to Mr. Hoffman was erroneous. The simple fact that 
Mr. Hoffman was driving a vehicle in which paraphernalia with residue was found in the 
trunk is insufficient to convict Mr. Hoffman of possession of a controlled substance. 
Mr. Hoffman's further support for this assertion is fully articulated in section l(C)(3)(d), 
supra, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
Taking the unrebutted factual assertions of Mr. Hoffman as true, as a result of 
counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel in this case, counsel's advice to plead guilty 
was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. As a 
result, Mr. Hoffman's plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered. 
However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual 
assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp. 79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine 
issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle 




Based upon the above argument and authority, Mr. Hoffman respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the district court's order summarily dismissing 
Mr. Hoffman's claims and remand this case to the district court with an order that the 
court hold an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Hoffman's claims. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 2011. 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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